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Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario: A
Limited Right to Government
Information under Section 2(b)
of the Charter
Daniel Guttman*

I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Before the relatively recent development of federal and provincial
access statutes, government information was not generally available to
the public. While the emergence of access to information legislation in
Canadian jurisdictions reflected important public policy decisions that
providing access to information promotes good government, the courts
had always recognized that there was no constitutional right to require
the government to disclose information. That has now changed. In
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security),1 the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously reached the novel
conclusion that the right to freedom of information protected by section
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 contained, in limited circumstances, a derivative right to government information. The
new right to government information recognized by the Court is an extremely narrow right. The Court found that that limited right was not
engaged on the facts of the Criminal Lawyers case and therefore overturned the majority decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.3 That
majority had held that provisions of the Freedom of Information and

*
Daniel Guttman is counsel at the Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the Attorney
General of Ontario (seconded to the criminal law division in 2010) and was counsel at the Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada in Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario. The views set out
in the article are his alone and are not the views of the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario
or the Government of Ontario.
1
[2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers”].
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
3
[2007] O.J. No. 2038 (Ont. C.A.).
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Protection of Privacy Act4 which allowed the Ontario government the
discretion to refuse to disclose a police report and two solicitor-client
privileged documents to the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (“CLA”)
infringed the CLA’s freedom of expression.
This paper discusses the new right to government information recognized by the Supreme Court in the Criminal Lawyers case. The paper is
broken down into seven parts. In Part II, I briefly summarize Ontario’s
statutory scheme governing access to government-held documents. In
Part III, I set out the facts of the Criminal Lawyers Assn. v. Ontario appeal and set the framework for the discussion of the constitutional issue.
In Part IV, I briefly describe the decisions of the courts below. In Part V, I
provide short descriptions of the positions of the parties in the Supreme
Court. In Part VI, I summarize the Supreme Court’s decision. In Part VII,
I discuss the new right to government information with a focus on the
analysis that led to the development of the right as well as its practical
significance.

II. ONTARIO’S FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY ACT
The guiding principles of Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act are that government information should be available to the
public and that necessary exemptions to this obligation should be limited
and specific.5 Thus FIPPA mandates that all government records must be
disclosed unless the government can show that the records fall within an
enumerated exclusion or exemption in the Act. FIPPA is remedial legislation that provides a right of access where none would otherwise exist.
FIPPA creates the Information and Privacy Commission (“IPC”) and authorizes it to oversee the information request process to ensure
independent oversight of Ontario’s response to information requests. The
IPC has the authority to review government records (where the government claims they fall within an exemption) to determine whether the
records do in fact fall within an exemption. The IPC can also order parts
of a record to be disclosed when the full record is not covered by the
exemptions.

4
5

R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 [hereinafter “FIPPA”].
Id., s. 1.
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Section 10 of FIPPA provides every person with a general “right of
access to a record” or “a part of a record”.6 However, as indicated in its
text, section 10 must be read in conjunction with sections 12 to 22, which
provide specific exemptions to the general right of access.7 The inclusion
of these exemptions reflects a careful balancing by the legislature of
competing interests (i.e., giving access to government-held information
while maintaining the ability to prevent harm from the disclosure of certain types of information). Some of the exemptions are mandatory while
others provide the government with a discretion not to disclose.8 The exemptions apply to Cabinet records; records that reveal the advice to
government by a public servant; law enforcement records; records where
disclosure would harm relations with other governments; defence records; records subject to solicitor-client privilege; records where
disclosure would harm the economic interests of the government or of
third parties or that could threaten the safety or health of someone; and
records where disclosure would represent an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.9
Section 23 provides for a “public interest override” for some of the
categories of exempted records. The public interest override is premised
on a balancing test, whereby the government must determine whether
there is a compelling public interest in disclosure that would outweigh
the purpose of the exemption. Section 23 does not apply to the more sensitive types of government record, including law enforcement or
solicitor-client privilege documents (the two exemptions at issue in
Criminal Lawyers), or to Cabinet or defence records.10
As a final safeguard of access, section 11 of FIPPA requires that, despite any other provision in FIPPA, any record in the government’s
possession which reveals a grave environmental, health or safety hazard
must be disclosed (assuming it is in the public interest to do so).11

6
Section 65 of FIPPA excludes certain records from the application of FIPPA and s. 67 retains the confidentiality provisions of certain other statutes.
7
Section 10 states it does not apply if the record “falls within one of the exemptions under
sections 12 to 22”.
8
Eleven of the 15 exemptions in FIPPA are discretionary exemptions.
9
An opportunity is given to any person whose interests may be affected to make representations on disclosure. Section 28 sets out the procedure in detail. FIPPA, ss. 12-22.
10
FIPPA, s. 23.
11
FIPPA, s. 11.
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1. The Solicitor-Client and Law Enforcement Exemptions at Issue
in Criminal Lawyers
As set out above, the solicitor-client and law enforcement exemptions are discretionary provisions that are not subject to the section 23
public interest override. Under the law enforcement12 exemption, the
government may refuse to disclose a law enforcement record where inter
alia the disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with law
enforcement or an investigation, reveal investigative techniques or disclose a confidential source. In addition, section 14(2) of FIPPA allows
the government to deny disclosure of a record “that is a report prepared
in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an
agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance
with a law”. The solicitor-client exemption (section 19) allows the government to refuse to disclose a record that is subject to solicitor-client
privilege or that “was prepared by or for Crown counsel for use in giving
legal advice” or for litigation.13
The police records and solicitor-client exemptions were included in
FIPPA on the basis of the report of the Williams Commission,14 which
recognized that in order to ensure effective government, confidentiality
in certain areas, including law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege,
was required.
A proposal to make these exemptions subject to the public interest
override (i.e., section 23) was expressly considered and rejected by the
legislature.15 In speaking against the proposed amendment, Ian Scott
(then Attorney General) described the two main reasons for excluding
these exemptions from the public interest override as follows:
(1) the Commissioner would not be aware of or able to take into
account the complex consequences of releasing to the public a record
that contains law enforcement information; and

12
“Law enforcement” is defined in s. 2 as policing or an investigation/inspection leading to
a hearing with penalties.
13
FIPPA, ss. 14, 19.
14
Public Government for Private People: The Report of the Commission on Freedom of Information and Individual Privacy (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1980) [hereinafter “Williams Commission”].
15
Bill 34 (the bill that eventually became FIPPA) was introduced in the Legislature on July
12, 1985.
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(2) solicitor-client privilege held by government should not be
abrogated by the Commissioner.16

III. THE CRIMINAL LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION’S
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
The case of Criminal Lawyers involved a request of information by
the CLA for a report into the failed murder prosecution of Graham Court
and Peter Monaghan. The prosecution was stayed in 1997 by Glithero J.
primarily on the basis that adequate disclosure had not been provided and
because the police had lost evidence.17
Not surprisingly, a great deal of media attention was given to the stay
of this high-profile murder case. Justice Glithero’s ruling led to an independent Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) investigation into the conduct
of the Hamilton police and the Crown attorneys involved in that prosecution. The OPP investigation concluded that although evidence had been
lost and inadequate disclosure made, there was no basis to charge either
the police or the Crown with obstructing justice. On April 3, 1998, the
OPP briefly explained its conclusion in a short news release:
The investigation into the missing audiotape found no evidence that the
officers attempted to obstruct justice by destroying or withholding a
vital piece of evidence. The investigation also found no evidence that
information withheld from defence was done deliberately and with the
intent to obstruct justice.

In a Hamilton Spectator article 10 days later, the Criminal Lawyers’
Association set out their disagreement with the OPP’s conclusion.
In an interview, Detective Inspector Mike Coughlin, the OPP probe’s
lead investigator, concurred with Glithero J.’s finding that the police officers and the Crown failed to provide all the evidence to the defence and
that the real issue was the reason behind the non-disclosure. Nevertheless, Coughlin was of the view that although the non-disclosure could be
due to a number of problems in police communication and procedure,
there was no intention to pervert justice, nor was there any commission
16
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 23 (June 8, 1987),
at 1168 (Hon. Mr. Scott), 1169 (Hon. Mr. Scott & Mr. Sterling), 1171 (Hon. Mr. Scott). See also
Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on the Legislative Assembly, M-67 (March 23,
1987) at M-9-M-10 (Hon. Mr. Scott), M-11 (Hon. Mr. Scott & Ms. Gigantes), M-20 (Hon. Mr. Scott
& Ms. Gigantes); Williams Commission, supra, note 14, at 294-95, and 338-39.
17
R. v. Court, [1997] O.J. No. 3450, 36 O.R. (3d) 263 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
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of crime. More importantly, Coughlin questioned the appropriateness of
Glithero J.’s use of 1990s disclosure law to decide a case that occurred in
the 1980s when disclosure policies and practices were less stringent.18
Following the OPP press release, the CLA submitted an access to information request under the FIPPA, seeking access to the records
underlying the OPP’s investigation. In response to this request, the government identified a number of responsive documents. However, the
government indicated, pursuant to the law enforcement (section 14), solicitor-client privilege (section 19) and personal privacy (section 21)
exemptions, that it would not disclose a number of documents. These
documents included the 318-page police report produced in the 1998 investigation,19 a 1998 memorandum and a March 24, 1998 letter. In
response, the CLA appealed to the IPC, arguing that sections 14 and 19
of FIPPA unjustifiably infringed the CLA’s freedom of expression.

IV. THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The CLA’s appeal to the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner was dismissed. The Assistant Commissioner agreed that the
records were exempt under sections 14, 19 and 21 and thus upheld the
decision not to disclose. He applied section 23 and concluded that the
public interest in disclosure outweighed the interest in non-disclosure
under the personal privacy exception in section 21. However, since sections 14 and 19 were not subject to the section 23 “public interest
override”, he did not order disclosure of the records. He rejected the
CLA’s claim that the denial of access to the records in question violated
section 2(b) of the Charter or the unwritten constitutional principle of
democracy.20
The CLA applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review. The
Divisional Court dismissed that application,21 explaining that “stripped to
its essentials”, the applicant’s position was that:
18
Nancy DeHart, “MP Wants Review of OPP Probe: Racco Inquiry Criticized”, Hamilton
Spectator, April 13, 1998, at A1.
19
The bulk of the report contains transcripts of the interviews conducted with the six persons subject to the investigation and five witnesses. The investigation included a review of the files
of the Police Services and Crown attorney at issue, and interviews with members of these police
services and the Attorney General as to their roles and responsibilities in relation to the criminal
proceeding.
20
Order PO-1779 of the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner (May 5, 2000).
21
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security), [2004] O.J.
No. 1214, 70 O.R. (3d) 332 (Ont. Div. Ct.), affd [2007] O.J. No. 2038, 86 O.R. (3d) 259 (Ont. C.A.),
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… the public [has] a general constitutional right — founded upon the s.
2(b) freedom of expression and the unwritten constitutional principle of
democracy — to have access to government-held information and
documentation, and to comment thereon, unless a balancing exercise,
conducted on a case by case basis, demonstrates that what is in the
public interest favours non-disclosure.22

The Court considered the various strands of jurisprudence relied on
by the CLA concerning (1) access to public facilities; (2) the “open
courts” principle; and (3) freedom of expression under international legal
instruments, and concluded that there was no constitutional right to government-held information. The CLA appealed to the Ontario Court of
Appeal.
A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the CLA’s appeal from the
Divisional Court. In a surprising decision, the majority concluded that
the combined operation of sections 10, 14, 19 and 23 of FIPPA infringed
section 2(b) and was not justified under section 1. The majority’s holding
was not made on any basis advanced by the CLA. Rather, the majority
held that they did not need to decide whether section 2(b) includes a
positive right to compel the disclosure of non-public government-held
information because the Act provides a statutory right of access (section
10) and limits on that statutory right should be considered government
interference with that right.23
Having concluded that it did not need to decide whether there is a
positive right to compel government to disclose information, the majority
went on to find that (1) the CLA’s desire to comment on apparent discrepancies between Glithero J.’s decision and the OPP press release was
“expressive activity” for the purposes of section 2(b); (2) sections 14 and
19 have as their purpose and effect “to directly restrict the public’s ability
to comment on those records”; and (3) the section 2(b) infringement was
not justified under section 1. It held that there was no need to consider
the CLA’s other argument — that FIPPA infringed the constitutional
principle of democracy — given its decision regarding section 2(b), and
that in any event that analysis would be duplicative of the section 2(b)
analysis. As a remedy, the majority read sections 14 and 19 into section
23, making those exemptions subject to the public interest override and

revd [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, 2010 SCC 23. The Divisional Court bench was composed of Blair R.S.J.
(as he then was), Gravely J. and Epstein J. (as she then was).
22
Id., at para. 32 (Div. Ct.).
23
Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, at paras. 37-39.
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sent the matter back to the IPC to consider whether section 23 applied in
the circumstances of this case.24
Justice Juriansz dissented, concluding that there was no violation of
section 2(b). He directly considered the CLA’s assertion that section 2(b)
included a positive right to compel government to disclose information in
its possession, and concluded, after reviewing the applicable jurisprudence, that it did not. He also disagreed with the majority’s conclusions
that section 23 limits freedom of expression in purpose or effect.25 In his
view:
•

The CLA was able to comment extensively on the OPP investigation.
Its further “desire to comment”, or its “potential comments” on the
OPP report have not yet occurred and are not “expressive activity”
within the meaning of section 2(b).

•

Section 2(b) does not mandate positive action by government to provide information in its control to a person so as to ameliorate that
person’s ability to express themselves. Here, “the extent to which
positive government action may, in exceptional cases, be required to
secure freedom of expression falls well short of the bold contention
… that the right to access government information is, structurally, a
component of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.

•

Given the careful and consistent distinction the Charter makes between freedoms and rights, principles of constitutional interpretation
cannot support a finding “that s. 2(b), which guarantees a freedom, has
a right grafted onto it as an unexpressed component of that freedom”.
This is especially so given the history of the drafting of section 2(b).
“It would be a “very big step” for the courts to interpret the Charter as
guaranteeing a right of access to government information when such a
right was proposed, considered and rejected by Canada’s parliamentary representatives.

•

While international law instruments can be considered in Charter
interpretation, consideration of these documents does not require the
court to read a right to access government information into section
2(b). “Neither it nor the decisions of courts and tribunals of other
countries or international organizations can overcome the dominating
weight of the other considerations reviewed above. Section 2(b) must
24
25

Id., per LaForme J.A.’s majority decision at paras. 30, 49, 64, 97.
Id., dissent of Juriansz J.A., at paras. 106-122, 135, 137, 153 and 168-172.
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be interpreted in the linguistic, philosophic and historical context of
its adoption by Canada.”
•

The majority’s argument fails to appreciate that the right to access
information under FIPPA “is strictly a creation of legislation”. “The
legislature is free to dictate the conditions and limitations on that
right, provided it does not do so in a discriminatory manner.” The
majority failed to read the Act as a whole and failed to recognize its
different purposes. The majority’s failure to properly interpret the
statement of purpose in section 1 of the Act and the principle that
there will be “necessary exemptions”, which “should be limited and
specific” led them to erroneously find that the only aim of the Act is
to provide access to government information, and that any limits
within the Act detract from the purpose. Thus, the majority’s finding
that section 23 restricts freedom of expression because it restricts the
statutory right in section 10 is an error which goes to the core of its
constitutional analysis — “it is not appropriate to pit one part of a
statute against another, first to find an underlying statutory right and
then to find the negation of that right”.

•

The majority’s remedy is an inappropriate use of “reading in”.26

1. Proceedings at the Supreme Court of Canada
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted on February 14,
2008. The Chief Justice of Canada stated the following constitutional
questions:
1.

Does s. 23 of [FIPPA] infringe s. 2(b) of [the Charter] by failing to
extend the public interest override to the exemptions found in ss.
14 and 19 of the Act?

2.

If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
under s. 1 [of the Charter]?

3.

Does s. 23 of [FIPPA] offend the constitutional principle of
democracy? 27

Oral arguments were heard in the Supreme Court of Canada, and
judgment was reserved on December 11, 2008.
26
27

Id., at para. 153.
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 382 (S.C.C.).
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V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AT THE SUPREME COURT
1. Ontario’s Position
As discussed above, a majority of the Court of Appeal found that the
provisions of FIPPA giving the government discretion to refuse to disclose the police report and solicitor-client privileged documents violated
the CLA’s freedom of expression. In the Supreme Court, Ontario took the
position that the majority’s decision — in effect, that section 2(b) of the
Charter includes a positive right to compel the disclosure of governmentheld documents that have traditionally been closed to the public (including documents that contain sensitive personal information, e.g., health
records) — represented a profound departure from the existing jurisprudence. Ontario argued, as Juriansz J.A. recognized in the Court of
Appeal, that the majority’s decision failed to accord any weight to “the
distinction between a freedom and a right” made in section 2(b), which
“remains a central feature of the Charter”. Moreover, it ran counter to the
Supreme Court’s clear holding that restricted access to many aspects of
government “is part of our history and our constitutional tradition” and
“the Canadian Charter was not intended to turn this state of affairs on its
head”.28
Ontario also argued that the effective result of the Court of Appeal’s
interpretation of section 2(b) was to read into the Charter an entirely new
and distinct right — a “right to government held information”. This was
despite the fact that the framers of the Charter expressly considered and
rejected by formal vote the inclusion of a right to information in the
Charter.29
Ontario further submitted that Juriansz J.A.’s dissent correctly identified the flaws in the majority’s position; in particular, that:
a) The majority’s decision represented a significant and unwarranted
expansion of s. 2(b) of the Charter by reading into it a new distinct
right to government information, which would considerably alter the
functioning of government.

28
Id., at para. 112; Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005]
3 S.C.R. 141, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City of Montreal”].
29
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and
of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 43 (January 22, 1981), at 101 (Mr.
McGrath), 101, 105-106, 116 (General Debate), (“Minutes of the Special Joint Committee on the
Constitution”).
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b) The fact that the legislature chose to enact positive measures
providing access to certain information in FIPPA does not mean that
limits on that statutory right are somehow transformed into a “gag” that
engages s. 2(b) and therefore must be justified under s. 1 of the
Charter.30

Ontario noted that after the Court of Appeal’s decision was rendered,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous jurisprudence that it will only
be in the rarest of circumstances that section 2(b) will support a claim for
positive government action.31 Ontario emphasized that the Criminal
Lawyers case did not involve any impairment of the CLA’s freedom of
expression (let alone satisfying the “substantial impairment of a freedom” requirement set out by the court in Dunmore v. Ontario32) and was
not, in any way, an exceptional case that would support a finding that
section 2(b) required the positive government action requested by the
CLA.
2. The CLA’s Position
In the Supreme Court of Canada proceedings, the CLA relied little
on the decision of the majority of the Court of Appeal. Rather, they argued the novel proposition that, contrary to Juriansz J.A.’s dissent,
section 2(b) of the Charter includes a positive right to compel the disclosure of government-held documents that have traditionally been closed to
the public.

VI. THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment was issued on June 17,
2010, 18 months after it was argued. The unanimous decision of the
Court,33 written by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Abella, allowed
the appeal and affirmed the validity of section 23 of FIPPA.

30
FIPPA, supra, note 4, ss. 10, 14, 19, 23; Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, Juriansz J.A., in
dissent, at paras. 117-119, 137.
31
Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Baier”].
32
[2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”].
33
The panel consisted of seven judges as Bastarache J. had recently retired (Deschamps J.
did not sit on the case).
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1. Overview of the Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the majority of the Ontario Court of
Appeal and upheld the constitutional validity of section 23 of FIPPA,
finding that there was no breach of the CLA’s section 2(b) right to freedom of expression. The Court went on to confirm that those documents
sought by the CLA that fell under section 19 were exempted from disclosure. The claim for the 318-page police report was returned to the
Information Commissioner for reconsideration on the question of
whether the government properly exercised its discretion when it decided
to refuse disclosure of the report.
2. Section 2(b) and the Right to Government Information
The Supreme Court accepted Ontario’s argument that there was no
general right under section 2(b) to obtain government documents. The
court recognized that section 2(b) “guarantees freedom of expression, not
access to information”.34 However, they found that “access is a derivative
right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful
expression on the functioning of government”.35 Thus the Court created a
new right, albeit an extremely narrow one, to government information
under section 2(b). The Court found that section 2(b) “includes a right to
access to documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and
functional constraints”.36
The Court came to this test by reformulating the three-step Irwin
Toy37/City of Montreal38 test for expressive activity to apply to a request
for information. The three-step test for the new right to government information as developed by the Supreme Court is as follows:
(1) Is access necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of
public importance?

34

S.C.C. decision, supra, note 1, at para. 30.
Id., at para. 30.
36
Id., at para. 31.
37
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
38
Supra, note 28.
35
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(2) If (1) is satisfied, is section 2(b) protection nevertheless removed
because requiring access to the documents would impair a privilege
or the functioning of the affected government institution?
(3) If (1) and (2) are satisfied, section 2(b) is engaged. However, section
2(b) is only breached if it can be shown that the state has infringed
that protection.39
The first and third components are essentially the first and third
components of the Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test. The second step of
the new test is a specific application of the more general second step of
Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test.40
3. Application of the New Criminal Lawyers test to the Court and
Monaghan affair
Applying this test, the Court found that the new section 2(b) right to
government information was not engaged or infringed on the facts of this
case as none of the steps were satisfied. First, the Court concluded that
the CLA had failed to establish that the information sought from the government was “necessary for meaningful public discussion of the
problems in the administration of justice relating to the Racco murder”,
noting that already, “much is known about these events”.41 Second, the
Court found that even if the documents were necessary for the CLA to
express itself meaningfully on this issue, section 2(b) was not engaged as
the CLA had not established that “access to ss. 14 and 19 documents,
obtained through the s. 23 override, would not impinge on privileges or
impair the functioning of relevant government institutions”.42 Finally, the
Court found that even if “s. 2(b) were engaged, it would not be
breached” as the request of the CLA to have sections 14 and 19 read into
section 23 would have little impact on the CLA’s ability to comment further. The Court explained as follows:
The ultimate answer to the CLA’s claim is that the absence of the
second-stage review, provided by the s. 23 override for documents
within ss. 14 and 19, does not significantly impair any hypothetical
right to access government documents, given that those sections,
39

Supra, note 1, at para. 33.
The second step of the Irwin Toy Ltd./City of Montreal test asks whether there is something in the method or location of that expression that would remove the protection.
41
S.C.C. decision, supra, note 1, at para. 59.
42
Id., at para. 60.
40
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properly interpreted, already incorporate consideration of the public
interest. The CLA would not meet the test because it could not show
43
that the state has infringed its rights to freedom of expression.

4. The Court’s Direction on the Exercise of Discretion under
FIPPA
The Court confirmed that discretionary decisions made under FIPPA
must conform to the well-accepted standard set out in Baker v. Canada
— namely, that “discretion conferred by statute must be exercised consistently with the purposes underlying its grant”.44 Thus, in order to
properly exercise disclosure, a Minister or a “head” must weigh the consideration for and against disclosure, including the public interest in
disclosure. The Court specifically directed that the purpose of the exemption at issue and all other relevant interests should be considered when a
“head” is deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion to disclose.
By way of illustration, the Court offered specific direction to a head making a decision under section 14. Section 14 requires the head consider
“whether a compelling public interest in disclosure outweighs the purpose of the exemption, to prevent interference with law enforcement”.45
Where a head finds that such an interest exists, the document should be
disclosed.
The Court also confirmed that a discretionary decision to refuse to
disclose a document is reviewable by the IPC and subsequently through
judicial review of the IPC decision. While the IPC may not substitute its
decision for the decision of the “head”, it may ask the “head” or Minister
to reconsider the decision where it appears to be exercised inappropriately (e.g., where the decision appears to have been made in bad faith,
“took into account irrelevant considerations; or, … failed to take into
account relevant considerations”).46
While the CLA had not challenged, at any level of court, the exercise
of the Minister’s discretion, the Court directed that the claim for the 318page police report be returned to the Information Commissioner for reconsideration on the question of whether the government properly
exercised its discretion when refusing to disclose the report. With respect
to the documents sought by the CLA that fell under the solicitor-client
43
44
45
46

Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 49.
Id., at para. 71.
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exemption in section 19, the Court viewed the matter very differently,
due to the categorical nature of solicitor-client privilege and the established case law affirming that solicitor-client privilege does not involve a
balancing of interests on a case-by-case basis.47
5. The Unwritten Constitutional Principle of Democracy
Given its finding that section 2(b) contained a right to information,
the Supreme Court did not consider the CLA’s similar challenge based on
the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

VII. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The decision in Criminal Lawyers is significant on many levels. The
following looks at three important aspects of the decision:
(1) the rejection of the traditional view that there is no right to information in section 2(b) of the Charter;
(2) the strict limits set on the new right to government information; and
(3) two specific doctrinal contributions made by Criminal Lawyers to
the section 2(b) jurisprudence, namely:
(a) the Court’s conclusion that the first prong of the Irwin Toy test
could theoretically be met by a denial to disclose information;
and
(b) the decision of the Court that the framework for analysis for a
request for information is not the Dunmore/Baier test for positive state action but the Irwin Toy/City of Montreal test.
1. The Rejection of the Traditional View that Section 2(b) Does Not
Include Any Right to Government Information
At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued (ultimately without complete
success) that the traditional view that there is no section 2(b) right to

47
The Court chose not to comment on Ontario’s submission that the IPC had found that the
318-page report fell not only into the law enforcement exemption but also into the solicitor-client
privilege exemption.
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compel government to disclose information is supported by a number of
strong grounds, including:
(1) the “linguistic, philosophic and historical context of the adoption” of
section 2(b), including its express exclusion from the Charter and the
absence of its historical protection;
(2) the jurisprudence that recognizes that section 2(b) operates as a
shield and not a sword except in very rare circumstances; and
(3) the jurisprudence that recognizes that maintaining privacy for many
government functions is consistent with section 2(b).
In Criminal Lawyers, while the Court did not accept these grounds as
a basis for rejecting a derivative right to information in section 2(b), the
strict limits imposed on the right suggest that these grounds were taken
into consideration by the Court. Each of these grounds is examined below.
(a) The Linguistic, Philosophic and Historical Context of the Adoption
of Section 2(b)
The bedrock principle of Charter interpretation is that each section of
the Charter should be interpreted in its linguistic, philosophic and historical context. As examined below in detail, Ontario argued that after
properly interpreting the freedom of expression protected by section 2(b)
(by looking at its linguistic, philosophic and historical context), it is clear
that that freedom did not include a right, no matter how limited, to freedom of information.
(i) Linguistic and Philosophic
The absence of language in the Charter providing a right to information was deliberate. The Special Committee of the House of Commons
and Senate on the Constitution of Canada expressly considered and, in a
formal vote, rejected a proposal to add a qualified “right to information”
into the Charter.48 The language of the proposed addition, which was to
be incorporated as “new section 5” of the Charter, was as follows:

48
Minutes of the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, supra, note 29, at 101 (Mr.
McGrath), 101, 105-106, 116 (General Debate).
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Right to information
5. Everyone has the right to have reasonable access to information
under the control of any institution of any government.

The federal government concluded that a statutory rather than constitutional right of access was preferable because information access raises
complex questions involving competing interests:
We think this is the proper approach to take … [governments] taking
their responsibilities to establish proper rules and proper procedures for
giving citizens access to information. Just to look at this [tabled federal
access to information legislation], how complex and thick it is,
illustrates the kind of problem that the proponents of this amendment
would be giving to the courts of our country — a citizen, if we
abandoned the legislative approach and turned to a judicial
determination, a citizen would go to court wanting a document, say,
that touches national security, and the judge on the bench would have
either to write this book from scratch without the benefit of a
committee like the Justice Committee which could call witnesses and
hear evidence and hear from officials and come up with a decision
which relates only to the document that he is being asked to give access
to.49

The proposal to constitutionalize a right to information was subsequently expressly rejected in a formal vote. Ontario argued that
significant weight should be accorded to that decision.50 While the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the fact that a right to information was
rejected by the founders, it placed little emphasis on that fact, and did not
feel the need to explain how a right that had been rejected could be imputed into section 2(b) or to cite case law on this issue such as Irwin Toy
or R. v. Prosper.
(ii) Historical
It is well accepted that the interpretation of a Charter right should
take into account the “historical origins of the concepts enshrined”. In

49

Id., at 105.
R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at 266-67 (S.C.C.); Irwin Toy,
supra, note 37, at 1003; R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at paras. 63-66
(S.C.C.); R. v. Blais, [2003] S.C.J. No. 44, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236, at paras. 39-41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hape,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, at para. 33 (S.C.C.); Court of Appeal, supra, note 3,
dissent, at paras. 113-119.
50
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this regard, Ontario argued that there is no historical legal right to information held by government either at common law or otherwise.
As La Forest J. recognized in 1997 in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of
Finance), the “idea that members of the public should have an enforceable right to gain access to government held information … is relatively
novel”. Similarly, in Fineberg v. Ontario, in which the Ontario Divisional
Court rejected a section 2(b) challenge to FIPPA nearly identical to the
one advanced in Criminal Lawyers, it was observed that “there is no history of unfettered public access to all information controlled by
government akin to our almost unqualified tradition of open courts”. As
recognized by the dissent in the Ontario Court of Appeal in the Criminal
Lawyers case, access to information enjoys no such historical position:
“[It] is not part of the baseline. It is a right that did not exist until the Act
was enacted.” Ontario argued that while legislators have recognized the
salutary policy objectives behind access to information legislation, the
passage of such legislation is a matter of policy, not a reflection of any
tradition of a fundamental right to be provided with government information.51 Ontario argued that there being no historical right to compel the
disclosure of government held information (outside of specific contexts
such as litigation where the use that can be made of that information is
limited by the implied undertaking rule), the only source of the right and
the limits of its scope are statutory, not constitutional.52
Ontario also demonstrated that the lack of a historical right was not
unique to Canada. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech does not include a right to
access government information outside of the courtroom. In 1978, in
Houchins v. KQED Inc., the majority of the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech requires
access by an individual to government information.53 The majority held
that refusing a broadcaster permission to inspect and photograph a
county jail where a prisoner had committed suicide did not violate the
First Amendment:
51
R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 343-44 (S.C.C.);
Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] S.C.J. No. 63, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403, at para. 59
(S.C.C.); Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg, [1994] O.J. No. 1419, at 6-7 (Ont. Div. Ct.);
McAuliffe v. Metropolitan Toronto Board of Commissioners of Police, [1975] O.J. No. 2432, 9 O.R.
(2d) 583, at paras. 17-19 (Ont. C.A.); Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Manitoba, [1986] M.J. No. 101,
at 4-5 (Man. C.A.).
52
Williams Commission, supra, note 14, at para. 134; Court of Appeal, supra, note 3, dissent, at paras. 117-119; Juman v. Doucette, [2008] S.C.J. No. 8, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.).
53
Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), at 14-15.
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The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an
Official Secrets Act ... Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government’s control.54

In 1999, in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court again confirmed that the First
Amendment does not protect a right to access government information
outside the courtroom:
This is not a case in which the government is prohibiting a speaker from
conveying information that the speaker already possesses. See Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). The California statute in
question merely requires that if respondent wishes to obtain the addresses
of arrestees it must qualify under the statute to do so. The Respondent did
not attempt to qualify and was therefore denied access to the addresses.
For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation, what we
have before us is nothing more than a government denial of access to
information in its possession. California could decide not to give out
arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment. …55

(b) The Well-Established Principle that Section 2(b) Operates as a
Shield and Not a Sword
It is well accepted that section 2(b) “generally imposes a negative
obligation on government rather than a positive obligation of protection
or assistance”. As stated colourfully in Haig: “The traditional view, in
colloquial terms, is that the freedom of expression contained in s. 2(b)
prohibits gags, but does not compel the distribution of megaphones.”56
Thus, absent “exceptional circumstances”, these cases established that
section 2 is restricted to protecting against government interference in the
exercise of the section 2 freedoms.

54

In Houchins, id., at 16, the concurring opinion of Stewart J. expressed the same position:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of access to information generated or controlled by the government, nor do they guarantee the press any
basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitution does no
more than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its
doors.
55
Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32
(1999), per Rehnquist C.J., at 40, per Stevens and Kennedy JJ. (emphasis added).
56
Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at
1035 (S.C.C.), per L’Heureux-Dubé J. [hereinafter “Haig”].
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The Supreme Court developed this proposition in three important
section 2(b) decisions. As examined briefly below, these cases make it
clear that there is no general section 2 Charter right to compel the government to assist in making expression maximally effective. The cases
reflect the sound reasons, including respecting the differing roles of
courts and legislatures, for courts to refuse to constitutionally impose
positive duties on government absent exceptional circumstances or express constitutional language imposing positive duties (e.g., Charter,
section 23).
In the first case, Haig v. Canada, the Supreme Court concluded that
section 2(b) does not include a positive right to be provided access to a
referendum as a means of expression, stating as follows:
The Court is being asked to find that this statutorily created platform
for expression has taken on constitutional status. In my view, though a
referendum is undoubtedly a platform for expression, s. 2(b) of the
Charter does not impose upon a government, whether provincial or
federal, any positive obligation to consult its citizens through the
particular mechanism of a referendum. Nor does it confer upon all
citizens the right to express their opinions in a referendum. A
government is under no constitutional obligation to extend this
platform of expression to anyone, let alone to everyone. A referendum
as a platform of expression is, in my view, a matter of legislative policy
and not of constitutional law.57

Haig was followed shortly after by Native Women’s Assn. of Canada
v. Canada. In that case the Supreme Court held that section 2(b) did not
impose a positive duty on the government to provide funding to the
Native Women’s Association of Canada to enable it to participate in a
constitutional conference organized by the government. The Court again
explained that “[t]he freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the
Charter does not guarantee any particular means of expression or place a
positive obligation upon the Government.”58 In Delisle v. Canada, the
Supreme Court held that section 2(b) did not require that the government
provide Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers with access to union

57

Id., at 1041.
Native Women’s Assn. of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627,
at 663 (S.C.C.). Justice McLachlin (as she then was) wrote a one-paragraph concurring judgment in
which she dismissed the challenge on the basis that neither s. 2 nor the Charter in general required
the government to consult with anyone in developing policy.
58
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membership to facilitate expression.59 The Court explained that “[i]t is
because of the very nature of freedom that s. 2 generally imposes a negative obligation on the government and not a positive obligation of
protection or assistance.”60 The Court stated that it would require “exceptional circumstances” to depart from the ordinary rule that “freedom of
expression imposes only an obligation that Parliament not interfere”.61
(c) The Charter Must Be Read to Respect the Fact that Many Government Functions Require Privacy
Ontario also relied on the important principle that many government
functions require privacy, a principle which was highlighted in 2005 in
the Supreme Court decision of City of Montreal. In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that section 2(b) does not mandate that every
government-owned space is available to be used for purposes of expression. Rather, in determining whether there is Charter protection in a
particular case, the court must consider the historical or actual function
of a place, and whether the space requires privacy and limited access:
Many government functions, from cabinet meetings to minor clerical
functions, require privacy. To extend a right of free expression to such
62
venues might well undermine democracy and efficient governance.

The Supreme Court went on to adopt a test that recognized “the reality that some places must remain outside the protected sphere of s. 2(b)”:
People must know where they can and cannot express themselves and
governments should not be required to justify every exclusion or
regulation of expression under s. 1. As six of seven judges of this Court
agreed in Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, the test must
provide a preliminary screening process. Otherwise, uncertainty will
prevail and governments will be continually forced to justify
restrictions which, viewed from the perspective of history and common
sense, are entirely appropriate. Restricted access to many governmentowned venues is part of our history and our constitutional tradition.

59

Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989
(S.C.C.). The main challenge was based on s. 2(d).
60
Id., at para. 26.
61
Id., at para. 38.
62
City of Montreal, supra, note 28, at paras. 71 and 76.
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The Canadian Charter was not intended to turn this state of affairs on
its head.63

The “open courts” cases also indicate that the scope of section 2(b)
should be defined in a manner consistent with the reality that some government functions must remain private. Thus, while finding that the
public has a right to receive information about the courts (places that
have always been open to the public) the Supreme Court has expressly
limited its findings to this context:
To this I would add a further caveat. I do not accept that the necessary
consequence of recognizing the importance of public access to the courts
is the recognition of public access to all facets of public institutions. The
Intervener, Attorney General for Saskatchewan argues that if an open
court system is to be protected under s. 2(b) of the Charter on the basis
that the public has an entitlement to information about proceedings in the
criminal courts, then all venues within which the criminal law is
administered will have to be accessible to the public, including jury
rooms, a trial judge’s chambers and the conference rooms of appellate
courts. The fallacy with this argument is that it ignores the fundamental
distinction between the criminal courts, the subject of this appeal, and
the other venues mentioned by the Intervener. Courts are and have, since
time immemorial, been public arenas. The same cannot be said of these
other venues. Thus, to argue that constitutional protection should be
extended to public access to these private places, on the basis that public
access to the courts is constitutionally protected, is untenable.64

(d) Conclusion on a Right to Information and Section 2(b) of the Charter
Ontario’s arguments that section 2(b) did not support a finding that it
included any right to information were rejected by the Court without
much analysis. That being said, many of those arguments seem to have
informed the strict test developed by the Court for the new limited right
to government information.65 As examined below, as the test is currently
constituted, the right to information in section 2(b) is very narrow, thus
raising questions as to the practical significance of the newly created
right.
63

Id., at para. 79 (emphasis added).
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No.
38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 28 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
65
For example, Ontario’s argument that a right to information would affect the effective
operation of government institutions by removing privacy seems to have found a place in the countervailing interest part of the new test.
64
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2. The Practical Significance of the Newly Created Right to
Government Information
The decision in Criminal Lawyers is an important one as it establishes a new right to government information located in section 2(b) of
the Charter. However, on a practical level, the new right may not have
much application. As examined below, the right to government information established by the Court in section 2(b) is an extremely narrow one.
This lies in contrast to the general approach in section 2(b) cases, where
claimants often sail through section 2(b) and the real battle is the question of whether the section 2(b) infringement is satisfied under Charter
section 1.
The test to determine whether section 2(b) is engaged by a denial of
access to government information has two components. First, a claimant
has the burden of demonstrating that access to information is necessary in
order for the claimant to meaningfully comment on an issue of public importance. Second, even where a prima facie case is made out, the claimant
must also demonstrate that there is no “countervailing interest” — specifically that access to the information sought would not impinge on a
privilege or impair the proper functioning of government institutions.
In my view, this test will seldom be met. First, in many cases, like
the Criminal Lawyers case itself, the claimant will be unable to demonstrate that without the information there cannot be meaningful
expression. In Criminal Lawyers, the CLA argued that it could not meaningfully comment on whether there was a cover-up of the botched
murder investigation and trial without seeing the report investigating the
police and attorneys involved in that trial. It is difficult to see how another claimant could demonstrate that this step of the test is satisfied in
his or her case when the CLA was unsuccessful in doing so in this case.
Second, the “countervailing interests” test is very broad, and will in
many cases dictate that a failure to disclose results in no infringement
regardless of whether the information is necessary for meaningful comment. The “countervailing interests” test can be invoked to justify the
non-disclosure of any document covered by “privilege”. Moreover, any
claimant who can satisfy the test for a prima facie case and survives the
privilege test will also have to pass the second part of the countervailing
interest test — the “government function” test.
The exemption for privileged documents is a broad one. In explaining why this component of the test was included, the Court stated as
follows:
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Privileges are recognized as appropriate derogations from the scope of
the protection offered by s. 2(b) of the Charter. The common law
privileges, like solicitor-client privilege, generally represent situations
where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the interests
served by disclosure. This is also the rationale behind common law
privileges that have been cast in statutory form, like the privilege
relating to confidences of the Queen’s Privy Council under s. 39 of the
66
Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5.

Commonly accepted privileges include solicitor-client privilege and
litigation privilege (both found in section 19 of FIPPA) as well as cabinet
privilege (section 12 of FIPPA). The scope of the word “privilege” as
used in the new test to access information is certainly wider than the
above three privileges. For example, the Court’s judgment expressly recognizes a “law enforcement privilege” set out in section 14.67
Given the court’s decision on the facts of Criminal Lawyers and, in
particular, its recognition that privileges may be in statutory form, arguably the denial of access to any document on the basis that it is covered by
one of the exemptions in FIPPA (sections 12 to 22) would take that denial out of the scope of section 2(b). Interestingly, the Court went on to
say that direct challenges to a statutory provision allowing for the nondisclosure of documents, while of course possible, would rarely be successful as the presence of a privilege would likely be found to remove
section 2(b) protection. The Court stated that while “assertions of particular categories of privilege are in principle open to constitutional
challenge”, “in practice, the outlines of these privileges are likely to be
well-settled, providing predictability and certainty to what must be produced and what remains protected”. Governments responding to section
2(b) challenges to privileges in statutory form will be able to rely on this
particular passage from the Court.
The final component of the countervailing interest test — the “government function exclusion” — is also potentially very broad. The Court
pointed to two examples where this exemption could be relied on to illustrate that the disclosure of some types of information, such as judicial
notes or Cabinet confidences, will obviously interfere with the effective
functioning of a government institution. In other cases where it is not
immediately obvious, the historic functioning of a place should be
66

Supra, note 1, at para. 39.
For example see id., at para. 29. The French version of the judgment also suggests that
the term “privilege” (“privilège” in French) includes statutory exemptions like the law enforcement
privilege.
67
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looked at to see if disclosure would interfere with the effective operation
of the institution.68
Finally, as in the Criminal Lawyers case itself, even where there is a
prima facie case that is not caught by the countervailing interest test, it is
open to the government to argue that the claimant has not demonstrated
that it is the state that has infringed the section 2(b) protection. In Criminal
Lawyers the Court found that, properly interpreted, sections 14 and 19 already required the government to consider the public interest when
exercising its discretion under these sections. Thus, on a practical level, the
remedy sought by the CLA — reading sections 14 and 19 into section 23
— would have little effect on the ability of the CLA to obtain documents.
In sum, the limits on the new right to government held information
are strict. In my opinion, it will only be the rarest of cases where a claimant can demonstrate that the denial of a request for information will
infringe section 2(b) of the Charter.
3. The Irwin Toy/City of Montreal Test under Section 2(b) of the
Charter
The Criminal Lawyers decision is important not simply because the
Court recognized a new right to information in section 2(b) of the Charter
but also because of the way it went about doing so. Below, I examine two
aspects of that process. First, the Court was able to locate a right to government information in section 2(b) because it was able to find, contrary to
the submissions of Ontario, that the first step of Irwin Toy was not a theoretical bar to a successful claim for information under section 2(b).
Second, in recognizing a limited right to information, the Court imposed a
positive obligation on government without applying the Dunmore/Baier
68

The Court stated, id., at para. 40:
It may also be that a particular government function is incompatible with access to certain
documents. For example, it might be argued that while the open court principle requires
that court hearings and judgments be open and available for public scrutiny and comment, memos and notes leading to a judicial decision are not subject to public access.
This would impair the proper functioning of the court by preventing full and frank deliberation and discussion at the pre-judgment stage. The principle of Cabinet confidence for
internal government discussions offers another example. The historic function of a particular institution may assist in determining the bounds of institutional confidentiality, as
discussed in Montréal (City), at para. 22. In that case, this Court acknowledged that certain government functions and activities require privacy (para. 76). This applies to
demands for access to information in government hands. Certain types of documents may
remain exempt from disclosure because disclosure would impact the proper functioning
of affected institutions.
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test previously developed for such claims. Both of these decisions bear
comment.
(a) The Application of the First Step of Irwin Toy to a Request for
Government-Held Information
Ontario argued at the Supreme Court of Canada that regardless of
whether the Court found that the Dunmore/Baier test applied to a denial
of a request for information, there was no section 2(b) breach because the
first step of Irwin Toy had not been satisfied. That initial question requires the claimant to demonstrate that the activity it is engaged in is an
“expressive activity”. Ontario argued that that step was not satisfied
where the impugned state action was a denial of a request for information
because a request for government held information was not an “expressive activity”. Any comments the CLA made regarding the discrepancy
between the findings of Glithero J. and the OPP investigation, its request
for access to information, and its complaints about the government’s refusal to disclose that information would be expressive activity. However,
there was no suggestion that the government has done anything to restrict
that expressive activity. While everyone, including the CLA, has a protected right to speak to government (including the right to request
information), there is no correlative Charter right to an answer from government, or to be provided with material on which to comment.
In making that submission, Ontario acknowledged that the protection
given by section 2(b) — the freedom of expression — which includes the
right to “express thoughts into words” or other means of expression,
guarantees the right to be free to express “information already in the possession of the person seeking to express it” and also guarantees a
listener’s right to hear words spoken freely. However, Ontario argued
that the freedom of expression does not guarantee the right to a dialogue,
or the right to force others to provide the content for expression.
In response, the CLA’s position was that it had satisfied the first step
of Irwin Toy. It argued that the comments it would make if it had access
to the requested information constitute its expressive activity. This argument was successful at the Divisional Court, which found that the
expressive activity at issue is the CLA’s “desire to comment publicly” on
the discrepancy between Glithero J.’s findings and the OPP’s conclusion.69
69

Supra, note 21, at para. 55.
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The CLA argument was also successful at the Court of Appeal. The
majority of the Court of Appeal characterized the expressive activity in
issue as “the potential comments the CLA would make should it receive
the requested information”.70 However, the dissent, in careful reasons,
found that the first step of Irwin Toy had not been met. While expressly
stating that “one should take an expansive view of what is ‘expressive
activity’”,71 Juriansz J.A. concluded that “in this case there is no expressive activity at issue. The CLA cannot escape the fact that its real
complaint is that the government failed to disclose information to it to
facilitate its proposed expression.”72 Justice Juriansz’s decision is important because as explored below, he found that to find there was
expressive activity in this case would do damage to the integrity of the
Irwin Toy framework.
Justice Juriansz’s decision began by considering the purpose of the
two-stage test developed in Irwin Toy. He began by describing the importance of keeping the two steps of the Irwin Toy test distinct, stating as
follows:
The two steps of Irwin Toy are analytically distinct. Each step serves a
different purpose and each has its own distinct focus. The first step
focuses on the person claiming the protection of s. 2(b). It examines a
person’s activity in order to determine whether that activity prima facie
falls within the scope of guaranteed free expression. At step one, the
challenged government action is not relevant. The second step focuses
on the challenged government action in order to determine whether its
73
purpose or effect is to restrict freedom of expression.

Justice Juriansz concluded that “the situation the CLA finds itself in
— having the ‘desire to comment’ and having ‘potential comments’ — is
not, in my view, expressive activity. It is, rather, the effect of the government’s refusal to disclose information”.74 Importantly, he noted that the
effect of the government’s action was not relevant at step one of the Irwin Toy analysis because “that focuses on the activity of the claimant.
The effect of the government’s refusal does not come into play until step
two of the Irwin Toy analysis is reached”.75

70
71
72
73
74
75

Supra, note 3, at para. 30.
Id., at para. 151.
Id.
Id., at para. 146.
Id., at para. 148 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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Justice Juriansz’s decision recognizes that the CLA did not engage in
expressive activity upon receiving notice of the government’s refusal to
disclose the requested information. Rather, receipt of the requested information was a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the CLA’s
potential expressive activity. As he stated, “without it, there is no expressive activity”.76 Similarly, even with the report, there could be no
expressive activity as it was possible that the CLA might decide not to
make any comment on the report. In Juriansz J.A.’s words, “the government’s act of refusing to disclose the information cannot, following the
Irwin Toy analysis, create expressive activity where none existed”.77
In its factum and oral argument, Ontario relied heavily on Juriansz
J.A.’s dissent to argue that no right of information could be found in section 2(b) because the first step of Irwin Toy had not been satisfied. In
Ontario’s view, this was a significant issue in the case, because if Ontario’s position was accepted, it would have completely closed the door
to any section 2(b) infringement for a request of information. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not engage in any analysis of this issue. In
one sentence, it came to the conclusion that whether the denial of a request for information was an expressive activity could only be answered
on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of all of the circumstances of
the case:
To demonstrate that there is expressive content [i.e., to show that the
first step of Irwin Toy is satisfied] in accessing such documents, the
claimant must establish that the denial of access effectively precludes
78
meaningful commentary.

With respect, the Supreme Court’s conclusion is open to the criticism
that it fails to keep the steps of the Irwin Toy test distinct. As had been
eloquently reasoned by Juriansz J.A. in his dissent in the court below:
To use the effect of the government’s decision to characterize the
CLA’s situation as “expressive activity” is to conflate steps one and
two of the Irwin Toy analysis. If the restrictive effect of the
government’s refusal is the basis for recognizing the CLA’s “potential
comments” or “desire to comment” as expressive activity at step one,
then the same refusal will, by definition, have the effect of restricting
expression at [the final] step … The same question will have been
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asked and answered at both steps. Clearly, there is a problem with the
79
way the CLA advocates applying the Irwin Toy analysis.

In my view, the Supreme Court’s decision to dismiss Ontario’s argument without analysis was an unfortunate one. It is clear from the
Court’s decision on this issue that it was not prepared to hold that the
Charter does not protect any right to government held information.
That being said, the Court seems to have taken Ontario’s submission
to heart (albeit not in the form requested by Ontario). By requiring a
claimant to demonstrate a prima facie case (i.e., that the denial of access
in their particular case precludes meaningful expression), the Court has
recognized that the denial of most requests for information will not “preclude meaningful commentary” on issues of public importance. Thus, the
vast majority of requests will be filtered out under the first step of the test
created by the Court because a claimant will not be able to demonstrate
that its request for information amounts to an “expressive activity” (i.e.,
will fail to show that denying access precludes meaningful commentary).
While not the complete bar argued for by Ontario, the combination of the
requirements of the prima facie case and the “countervailing interests”
test, will make it difficult for a claimant to establish that a denial of information engages section 2(b) of the Charter.
(b) The Decision of the Court Not to Apply the Dunmore/Baier Test
In Criminal Lawyers, the Supreme Court placed a constitutional burden on government to act proactively (e.g., by requiring the government
to disclose information, albeit in limited circumstances) without having
applied the Dunmore/Baier analysis.80 The implications of the decision
of the Court to impose a positive obligation by reformulating the Irwin
Toy test rather than applying the Dunmore test is explored below.
(i) The Dunmore/Baier Test
In Baier, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that it would require exceptional circumstances for section 2(b) of the Charter to require positive
79
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At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued inter alia that the government’s refusal to disclose
a police report and solicitor-client privileged information did not infringe freedom of expression
because s. 2(b) of the Charter does not generally impose a positive obligation on government and the
facts of Criminal Lawyers did not meet the stringent test for an exception to that general rule, laid
out in Dunmore and Baier.
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government action. In that case, the Court rejected the claimant’s argument that section 2(b) includes a positive right to the statutory platform
of school trusteeship to assist expression.81 The Supreme Court reaffirmed that to depart from the general rule that section 2 imposes only
negative obligations on government, would require exceptional circumstances that meet the three factors identified previously by the Court in
Dunmore. The Court explained: “In cases where a government defending
a Charter challenge alleges, or the Charter claimant concedes, that a
positive rights claim is being made under s. 2(b), a court must proceed in
the following way”:
First it must consider whether the activity for which the claimant seeks
s. 2(b) protection is a form of expression. If so, then second, the court
must determine if the claimant claims a positive entitlement to
government action, or simply the right to be free from government
interference. If it is a positive rights claim, then third, the three
Dunmore factors must be considered.82

The Court went on to summarize the three Dunmore factors that must
be met before a positive rights claim under section 2(b) can succeed:
… these three factors are (1) that the claim is grounded in a
fundamental freedom of expression rather than in access to a particular
statutory regime; (2) that the claimant has demonstrated that exclusion
from a statutory regime has the effect of a substantial interference with
s. 2(b) freedom of expression, or has the purpose of infringing freedom
of expression under s. 2(b); and (3) that the government is responsible
for the inability to exercise the fundamental freedom. If the claimant
cannot satisfy these criteria then the s. 2(b) claim will fail. If the three
factors are satisfied then s. 2(b) has been infringed and the analysis will
83
shift to s. 1.

(ii) The Relevance of the Dunmore/Baier Test to a Right to
Government-Held Information
At the Supreme Court, Ontario argued that the Dunmore/Baier
analysis applied because the claimants sought a positive entitlement to
government action rather than the right to be free from government interference (i.e., the claimants seek a positive right to compel the disclosure
of government held information rather than freedom from any prohibi81
82
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tion on their own conduct). The CLA argued it was seeking only a negative right to be free from government interference with expression and
therefore that the Dunmore/Baier test did not apply. The majority of the
Court of Appeal never considered this argument.84 The dissent carefully
considered the issue and found that indeed what was being sought was a
positive right and not to be free from negative interference. Somewhat
surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not answer this fundamental issue in
any detail. It simply stated the following:
Determining whether s. 2(b) of the Charter requires access to
documents in government hands in a particular case is essentially a
question of how far s. 2(b) protection extends. A question arises as to
how the issue should be approached. The courts below were divided on
whether the analysis should follow the model adopted in Dunmore v.
Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. In
their argument before this Court, [Ontario] placed reliance on Dunmore
and on this Court’s subsequent decision in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC
31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673. In our view, nothing would be gained by
furthering this debate. Rather, it is our view that the question of access
to government information is best approached by building on the
methodology set in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at pp. 967-68, and in Montréal (City) v. 29521366 Québec Inc., 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141). The main
question in this case is whether s. 2(b) is engaged at all. We conclude
that the scope of the s. 2(b) protection includes a right to access to
documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and
85
functional constraints.

The Court’s decision to impose a duty on government to disclose information, albeit in limited circumstances, without finding the
Dunmore/Baier test was satisfied, and with little explanation, is very

84
In Baier, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that what was being requested was not
a positive entitlement to government action and specifically recognized that using a statute as the
foundation against which to find “government interference” conflates statutory and constitutional
rights, with the effect of constitutionalizing a statutory regime. See Baier, supra, note 31, at paras.
35-42. The relevant question is whether the claimant seeks a Charter entitlement to positive government action rather than a right to be free from government interference. Thus, that FIPPA may
establish statutory rights is irrelevant to the positive nature of CLA’s claim that s. 2(b) requires the
government to take the positive step of providing records.
85
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peculiar.86 Ontario argued that Dunmore/Baier applied and that in particular, the first Dunmore factor would preclude a request for information
ever satisfying the test to require positive government action.87 That is
because, as argued by Ontario, a claim for information is a claim to access a statutory regime and is not grounded in freedom of expression. In
my view, this argument would have been very strong. Perhaps the decision not to apply Dunmore/Baier can be explained as follows: not
wanting to shut the door completely on a right to government information, and not wanting to dilute the Dunmore/Baier framework for future
“positive rights” cases, the Supreme Court was forced to come up with
an alternative framework for analysis.
In my view, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court’s decision not to apply the Dunmore/Baier test in Criminal Lawyers will impact future
challenges which seek to impose positive obligations on the state. In this
regard, the Criminal Lawyers case will not be viewed in future cases as a
“platform” case by the Supreme Court but as a case that is sui generis in
nature. The case can be distinguished from Haig, NWAC, Delisle and Baier
on the basis that what was sought in Criminal Lawyers was government
information, which cannot (according to the Court) be equated to the access to platforms for expression sought in the other four cases. Thus in my
view, the Criminal Lawyers case does not change the analytical framework
in cases where what is sought is positive government action. Indeed, the
Court’s choice of language in deciding not to turn to the Dunmore/Baier
framework does not indicate a repudiation of the test in the context of a
claim to positive state action. Where what is sought is access to a statutory
platform for expression (or access to a statutory labour relations regime in
the context of section 2(d) cases) Dunmore/Baier will continue to apply.

VIII. CONCLUSION
For the first time, the Supreme Court has held that section 2(b) of the
Charter includes a right to government-held information, albeit in limited
circumstances. The Court found that section 2(b) includes a right to access to documents “where access is necessary to permit meaningful
86
Compare with the considered analysis of this issue in Greater Vancouver Transportation
Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31,
2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, at paras. 25-36 (S.C.C.).
87
Ontario also argued (a) that it would be a rare denial of information that would satisfy the
second Dunmore factor or “substantial impairment” test; and (b) that the third Dunmore factor was
not met because it was not the state that was the source of the infringement.
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discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and
functional constraints”.88
It remains to be seen how the test established by the Supreme Court
will be applied by lower courts. As discussed in this paper, it is my opinion that it will be a rare denial of a request for information that will
satisfy the Criminal Lawyers test for a section 2(b) infringement. In addition, in the rare case where a claimant is able to demonstrate a prima
facie case and establish that disclosure would not impair a privilege or
the effective operation of a government institution, the government may
be able to invoke section 1 to justify non-disclosure.
While the CLA and media and other interveners would like to have
seen a more robust right, the gains made in the Criminal Lawyers case
are not insubstantial. The fact remains that it is now theoretically possible to use section 2(b) of the Charter to require government to disclose
information. The recognition of a new Charter right to information will
cause all governments to carefully consider the constitutional validity of
the provisions of their existing access legislation and proceed cautiously
with any amendments that reduce access.
Finally, the emphasis in the Criminal Lawyers decision on the importance of the proper exercise of discretion is important. In my view, the
Court’s focus on the proper exercise of discretion is a signal to government that discretionary decisions refusing to disclose information will be
carefully reviewed by information commissioners and courts on administrative law grounds. Paramount in the exercise of the discretion is
whether the public interest outweighs the purpose of an exemption, and a
government that fails to provide adequate reasons for non-disclosure can
expect to be asked to justify the exercise of discretion upon judicial
review. The Court’s direction on this issue is entirely consistent with Ontario’s main purpose in enacting FIPPA: that government information
should be available to the public except where a countervailing interest
justifies a decision to resist disclosure for the greater public good.
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